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CRA WFORD V. MARION CouNTY ELECTION BOARD: THE
MISSED OPPORTUNITY To REMEDY THE AMBIGUITY AND
UNPREDICTABILITY OF BURDICK
INTRODUCTION

The right to vote has been described as the most precious of rights
in a democratic society because it protects so many other rights.' The
Supreme Court has long recognized the individual's right to vote as a
fundamental right,2 with states having the constitutional right to manage
election procedures. 3 In earlier cases, the Court reviewed many election
regulations using something akin to strict scrutiny analysis.4 However,
the Court realized the tenuous balance between the individual's right to
vote and the state's right to manage elections.5 Seeking to develop a
standard that would adequately balance these competing rights, the Court
developed a test to accomplish the goal.6 This balancing test weighs the
burden on the right to vote against the state interests in passing legislation that manages election procedures, 7 unfortunately, though, it has lead
to differing interpretations producing unpredictable outcomes. 8
The Court had the opportunity to resolve the ambiguity and unpredictability resulting from prior decisions when it granted certiorari to
review the constitutionality of Indiana's Senate Enrolled Act No. 483
("SEA 483") 9 in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.'0 In a 6-3
decision, the Court held that SEA 483 was constitutional; however, the
plurality opinions reached that conclusion by very different reasoning. "
The Court's lack of unity did nothing to settle the confusion courts were
experiencing when determining the correct application of prior
precedent, 12 or to provide guidance on how to measure the severity of a

1.
Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisementand the Constitution: Findinga Standard
that Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1174 (2007) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62

(1963)).
2. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,433 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788
(1983); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,667 (1966).
3.

U.S. CONST. art. L § 4, cl.1.

4.

See Harper,383 U.S. at 666-68.

5.

Anderson,460 U.S. at 788.

6.
7.

Id.at 789.
Id.

8.
9.
10.

See Ordway, supra note 1, at 1192.
S.B. 483, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).

II. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the majority opinion rests its decision
on a balancing approach while the concurrence bases its decision on an "important regulatory interests" standard).
12. Id.at 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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burden on the right to vote.' 3 The Court's plurality opinions demonstrate
the need for a new rule to evaluate the constitutionality of election regulations.
Part I of this Comment explains the evolution of the standard the
Court has used in its election law jurisprudence with three important
cases-Harper,Anderson, and Burdick-and establishes the legal climate and precedent prior to Crawford. Part II discusses Crawford by
starting with the facts and procedural history and then turning to the plurality opinions and dissents. Part Ill.A discusses the issues left unresolved by the Crawford decision-namely the ambiguity and unpredictability of the Anderson and Burdick standards. Part III.B suggests a new
rule to resolve the limitations of the Anderson standard in reviewing
election law challenges. The suggested rule would maintain the presumption of constitutionality for election laws. However, if there is evidence of political party entrenchment or the law disproportionately impacts an identifiable group that shares a particular political ideology, an
intermediate level of scrutiny would be applied. Part III.C discusses the
importance of facial challenges in light of Crawford. Part IV concludes
that this new rule will remove the ambiguity and unpredictability from
election law cases, protect against political party entrenchment and discriminatory effects, and maintain the state's ability to manage its elections.
I. BACKGROUND
The Constitution expressly grants the right to vote in federal elections; 14 however, no such right is expressly granted for voting in state
elections.1 5 Despite this omission, the Court has found the right to vote
in state elections to exist implicitly in the First Amendment and to be
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment, with challenges generally brought as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 16 The following three cases demonstrate the right to vote has remained fundamental,
but the approach used in detecting unconstitutional infringements of the
right has changed.

13.

David Schultz, Election Law: Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraudand the

Coming of the Second GreatDisenfranchisement,34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 483, 530 (2008).

14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
15.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
16. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) ("It must first consider the character
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."); see also Harper, 838 U.S. at 666 ("Our cases demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter qualifications which invidiously
discriminate.").
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17
A. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections

In Harper, Virginia residents challenged the constitutionality of a
section of the Virginia Constitution that required residents to pay a poll
tax in order to register to vote. i8 The issue was whether a voter's affluence (i.e., the ability to pay the poll tax) was a valid qualification for
voting. 19 In a 6-3 decision, the Court held the poll tax unconstitutional
because a classification that makes voter wealth a qualification for exercising the right to vote was an invidious discrimination and invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °
Although passing on the possible issue of racial discrimination, 2'
the Harper Court did stress the fundamental importance of the right to
vote in a democratic society because it protects and preserves all other
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 22 In fact, so important is the right
to vote that the Court believed it was the driving force behind President
Lincoln's philosophy of "government of the people, by the people, [and]
for the people., 23 After identifying the right at stake, the Court then
turned to the level of review required for its analysis.
The Court did not expressly state it was reviewing the poll tax under
strict scrutiny but noted that when a classification infringes upon a fundamental right under equal protection, the classification "must be closely
scrutinized and carefully confined., 24 Under this level of review, the
Court found no relation between the ability to pay the poll tax and an
individual's qualifications to exercise the right to vote.
The lack of
relationship between economic status and voter qualifications placed an
unnecessary burden on the right to vote, which would be an invidious
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 The final
sentence of the majority opinion simply stated that "the right to vote is
too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned. 27
Harperprovided no guidance on how election regulations would be
reviewed in the future. Was the poll tax unconstitutional because it had
no relation to voter qualifications, thus failing under any level of scrutiny? Or did the infringement on the fundamental right to vote trigger a

17.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
18. Id. at 665 n. 1 (discussing the various sections of the Virginia Constitution that authorize
the poll tax). In 1965, one-year prior to Harper,the Virginia poll tax was declared a violation of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment as a prerequisite to voting in federal elections. Harman v. Forssenius,
380 U.S. 528, 544 (1965).
19.
See Harper,383 U.S. at 665-66.
20. Id. at 666-67.
21.
Id. at 666 n.3.
22. Id. at 667 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
23.
Id. (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1963) (alteration in original)).
24.
Id. at 670.
25.
Id. at 666.
26.
Id. at 666-67.
27.

Id. 670 (referring to conditioning the right
to vote on affluence).
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heightened level of scrutiny? If the latter is true, then nearly all election
regulations would be declared unconstitutional, which would be contrary
to an express provision of the Constitution.28
The Constitution expressly grants states the power to regulate the
time, place, and manner for holding elections of senators and representatives to the United States Congress.29 In order for elections to be fair,
honest, and orderly there is a need for substantial regulation,30 which
necessarily burdens the right to vote. 31 The fear is that subjecting all
election laws to strict scrutiny analysis, which Harper may suggest,
would frustrate the state's ability to effectively manage elections and
render its constitutional power a nullity. 32 In Anderson, the Court announced an approach in reviewing election laws that sought to protect
the fundamental right to vote while respecting the state's right to regulate
its elections.33 The new approach was a noble effort, but the result would
Scalia to refer to it as "Anderson's amorphous flexilater prompt Justice
34
ble standard.,
B. Anderson v. Celebrezze

35

John Anderson sought to have his name included on the ballot as an
independent candidate for President in the Ohio primary election but was
denied because of Ohio's early candidacy registration requirements for
independent candidates.36 Although Anderson was denied access to the
ballot, the issue became whether the early registration deadline was an
unconstitutional infringement on the right to vote of Anderson's supporters.37 Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion,38 holding the early
registration deadline unconstitutional.39 Justice Stevens concluded that

1.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.
29. Id.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
30.
(1974)).
31.
Id.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433. But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and
32.
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV.
793, 795 (2006) (discussing the myth "that strict scrutiny is an 'inflexible' rule that invalidates every
(or nearly every) law to which it applies").
33. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 ("Although these rights of voters are fundamental, not all
restrictions imposed by the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally
suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates.").
34. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
36. Id. at 783 n. 1 (explaining the challenged Ohio statute).
37. Id. at 782.
38. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall joined in the majority
opinion. Id. at 781.
39. Id. at 805-06.
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the deadline may substantially impact independent voters 40 and that this
burden outweighed the state's minimal interest for the regulation. 4'
For purposes of analysis, the Court drew the parallel between the
rights of the candidate and those of the voter because a burden on one is
necessarily a burden on the other.4 2 The Court also recognized the dichotomy between the individual's right to vote and the state's right to
regulate elections, noting that "the [s]tate's importantregulatory interests
are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 43 The Court did not expand on what was meant by nondiscriminatory--either facially nondiscriminatory or a nondiscriminatory effect-but would later state that burdens falling on a particular voter segment would be hard to justify by the state. 44 The Court then announced
the following approach to guide its analysis:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the ... [Constitution] that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.... [T]he Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it must also consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. 45
In Storer v. Brown,46 which seems to have borne the early parameters of this approach,4 7 Justice White rather prophetically stated: "What
the result of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult
to predict with great assurance. 48 The unpredictability stems from the
ambiguity created by three possible interpretations of the Anderson standard. First, the standard may simply stand for a balancing test between
the burden on the individual's right to vote and the interest of the state.49
Second, the standard could suggest that identifying the magnitude of the

40. Id. at 790.
41.
Id. at 806.
42. Id. at 786.
43. Id. at 788 (first and second emphasis added). This quotation was cited in both Burdick
and Crawford. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008); Burdick v.
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). Justice Scalia believed the statement, as used in Burdick, helped
refine the Anderson approach into "an administrable rule." Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
44.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786, 792-93.
45.
Id. at 789.
46.
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
47.
See id. at 730.
48.

Id.

49.
This appears to be the interpretation the Anderson Court adopts, as it finds the state interests do not outweigh the burden on the right to vote. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806.
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burden on the right to vote triggers a set level of scrutiny by the Court.5 °
Finally, the standard could also support the idea that the level of scrutiny
is on a sliding-scale, where the level of scrutiny increases correspondingly with an increase of the burden on the right to vote. 5' The Court
seemed to adopt the balancing test interpretation as it found the burden
on the right to vote outweighed the state interest, but in doing so, it left
few clues as to the proper application of this interpretation.
The Court found there to be a "particular" burden on the rights of an
identifiable segment of Ohio voters. 52 The existence of this particularized burden prompted the Court to note that "it is especially difficult for
the State to justify a restriction that limits political participation by an
identifiable political group whose members share a particular viewpoint,
associational preference, or economic status. 5 3 The previous passage
suggests the Court viewed the burden on the right to vote to be sufficient
enough to elevate the state's burden in showing that the deadline was
necessary to protect its interests. However, the Court never defined the
magnitude of the burden on the right to vote, which is troubling because
under any interpretation of the standard the first step of the analysis is to
identify the level of the burden. 4 Equally troubling, the Court did not
provide any guidance on how to measure the magnitude of the burden on
the right to vote.
The Court then closely reviewed-without announcing a level of
scrutiny-the state's asserted interests of voter education, equal treatment of candidates, and political stability, 55 not only looking at the legitimacy of the interest, but also how well the early registration deadline
served those interests.5 6 After determining the state interests to be minor,
and not advanced by the deadline,57 the Court declared them insufficient
to outweigh the burden on the right to vote. 58

50. This is the interpretation, although refined by Burdick, which Justice Scalia adopts. See
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 at 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
51.
This is the interpretation that the Burdick Court seemingly adopted. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens Firstand
FourteenthAmendment rights.").
52. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790, 792 ("An early filing deadline may have a substantial impact
on independent-minded voters"). This evidences that the Court has been willing to look at generalized burdens that impact voters differently-contrary to Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793.
54.
Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1624; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806; see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
55. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796-802.
56. Id. at 797-98, 800-01.
57.
Id. at 798, 801, 805.
58.
Id. at 806.
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Justice Rehnquist dissented 59 in Anderson because he believed the
Court's precedent never required a state to narrowly tailor its election
laws. 6° Instead, Justice Rehnquist stated it was the Court's duty to make
sure the state was not attempting to freeze the "status quo.",6 1 If it was
not, then the "State's laws will be upheld if they are tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and are in no sense invidious or arbitrary. 62
Justice Rehnquist believed that the early registration deadline passed this
test and would have found it constitutional.6 3
Anderson attempted to create an approach that would protect the
rights of individuals and states, but the end result was an ambiguous
standard with three possible interpretations. Anderson adopted the balancing test interpretation, but it did not provide guidance on how to
measure the burden on the right to vote nor did it reveal the level of scrutiny to apply when reviewing the state interest. The ambiguity of the
Anderson standard and the Court's lack of guidance in its application
lead to unpredictable outcomes. In Burdick, the Court followed the sliding-scale interpretation of the Anderson standard instead of the balancing
test, evidencing the ambiguity. 64 Further, the majority and dissenting
opinions reached different conclusions
as to the magnitude of the burden,
65
evidencing the unpredictability.
Another factor that may have played a role in choosing a different
interpretation of Anderson is that the composition of the Court changed
during the time between the Anderson and Burdick decisions. Justices
Stevens, Blackmun, Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor were the only justices to hear both cases. In Anderson, Justices Stevens and Blackmun
were in the majority, whereas Justices Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor
dissented. In Burdick, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O'Connor were in the majority, whereas Justices Stevens and Blackmun
dissented.
66
C. Burdick v. Takushi

At issue in Burdick was whether Hawaii's ban on write-in voting
was a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.6 7 Alan Burdick
was a registered voter in Hawaii claiming he would cast a write-in vote
for a person who was not on the ballot and, among other things, had the
59.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent).
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 817 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971)).
62.
Id. (quoting Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted)).
63.
Id. at 818, 823.
64.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
65.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
66.
504 U.S. 428 (1992).
67.
Id. at 430.
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right to cast a write-in "protest vote for Donald Duck" or anyone else he
chose. 68 Burdick argued that any infringement on this right was unconstitutional. 69 Justice White, delivering the opinion of the Court, acknowledged that the right to vote is fundamental ° but, as in Anderson, qualified the right as non-absolute. 7' In holding Hawaii's ban on write-in
voting constitutional, the Court rejected the argument that all voting regulations should be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis 72 and applied An-

derson's "more flexible standard. 7 3
As the Court began its analysis, it seemingly used the sliding-scale
interpretation of the Anderson approach by declaring that the rigorousness of its inquiry was dependent on the magnitude of the burden on the
right to vote. 74 The first step of the analysis found a "very limited" burden on the right to vote. 5 Hawaii had three mechanisms through which
a candidate could gain access to the ballot at least sixty days prior to the
primary election 76 and the Court believed these mechanisms reduced the
burden on the right to vote.77
However, after finding the burden limited,78 the Court noted, "the
State need not establish a compelling interest to tip the constitutional
scales in its direction., 79 This would suggest that the Court viewed the
Anderson standard as triggering a set level of scrutiny depending on the
magnitude of the burden on the right to vote.80 A possible explanation is
that the Court was merely referencing an earlier quotation from Norman
v. Reed,8' stating that a state would have to show a compelling interest in
order to justify a severe burden on the right to vote.82 In Norman, however, the statement was an example of a sufficiently weighty corresponding interest as opposed to saying that a severe burden triggers strict scrutiny."

68.
Id. at 430, 438 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at 438.
70. Id. at 433 (quoting Ill.
Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979)).
71.
Id. at 433 (citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986)).
72. Id.at 432.
73. Id. at 434.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 437. The majority opinion also characterized the burden as "limited" and "slight."
Id. at 438-39.
76. Id. at 435-36 (explaining that the three mechanisms to gain ballot access were filing
through a party petition, an established political party, or a designated non-partisan ballot).
77. Id. at 436-37.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
81.
502 U.S. 279 (1992).
82. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Norman, 502 U.S. at 289).
83. Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89 ("To the degree that a State would thwart this interest by
limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation, and we have accordingly required any

2009] CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD

543

The Court quickly analyzed the asserted state interests of avoiding
unrestrained factionalism and party raiding 84 and came to the conclusion
that the legitimate state interests outweighed the burden on the right to
vote.85 The use of the word "outweighed" suggests the Court was using
the balancing test interpretation of the Anderson standard. However, this
may just be a result of the sliding-scale analysis as there inevitably must
be a comparison between the burden on the right to vote and the state
interest.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Blackmun, dissented in Burdick.86 Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority opinion
that Anderson was the correct standard, but seemed to follow the balancing test interpretation. Justice Kennedy believed the record showed that
the write-in ban placed a significant burden on the right to vote 87 and was
unnecessary to advance the state interests.8 8 Justice Kennedy, therefore,
would have declared the write-in ban unconstitutional as the state's asserted interests were insufficient "under any standard" to justify the limitation on the right to vote.89
Criticizing the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy stated: "The majority's analysis ignores the inevitable and significant burden a write-in
ban imposes upon some individual voters by preventing them from exercising their right to vote in a meaningful manner." 90 This line of reasoning is also consistent with Anderson's statement that a state would have a
difficult time justifying a regulation that disproportionately burdened
certain groups. 9 1 It is also significant to recognize the Court's cognizance of how election regulations can affect voters that fall within identifiable groups of the voting population at large.
Burdick further muddied the already murky Anderson water by injecting new language into the analysis. The Burdick Court replaced the
Anderson requirement of looking at the legitimacy and strength of the
state's interests with looking at the state's precise interests. 92 The Court
did not define what "precise" interest means, which adds to the ambiguity of the Anderson standard. Further, the Court added that the state interests would have to be compelling and narrowly tailored to justify a

severe restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.")
(internal citations omitted).
84. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439-40.
85. Id. at 440.
86. Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 448.
89. Id. at 450.
90.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
91.
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983).
92.
Compare Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, with Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. This alteration may
be an import from Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Anderson. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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severe burden on the right to vote.93 Unfortunately, the Court did not
announce how to measure the severity of a burden. Taken as a whole,
the Court's language could be read as adopting either the sliding-scale or
trigger interpretation of Anderson. The Burdick Court failed to relieve
the interpretation ambiguity of Anderson, to announce a test to measure
the severity of the burden on the right to vote, or to provide an answer as
to what a precise state interest is.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, five lower court
cases decided the constitutionality of voter photo ID laws. 94 Three of
these cases upheld the voter photo ID law, while the other two found the
law unconstitutional. 95 The courts upholding the voter photo ID laws
applied the flexible standard of Burdick96 in determining the laws were
not a severe burden on the right to vote.97 However, in the cases holding
the law unconstitutional, the District Court of New Mexico used the Burdick test and applied a level of scrutiny similar to that in Anderson, and
the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected the Burdick test and used state
constitutional law in declaring the law unconstitutional.9 8 With courts
following different interpretations of Burdick, measuring the burden on
the right to vote differently, or being unwilling to follow Burdick, combined with the recent national prominence of voting rights, 99 the Supreme
Court noted the importance of voter photo ID cases and granted certiorari
to hear Crawford.'°°
HI.CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD 01
Following the problems stemming from the 2000 Presidential Election, voter rights became an issue of national prominence. Congress
passed legislation, such as the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA"), seeking to alleviate some of the issues faced in the 2000 election. 10 2 Former
President Jimmy Carter and James A. Baker HI co-chaired a commission
that issued a report with recommendations on how to restore voter confi93.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
94. See Schultz, supra note 13, at 503-22 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County Election
Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007); ACLU of N.M. v.
Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.N.M. 2007); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d
1333 (N.D. Ga. 2005); In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA
71, 740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007); Weinshenck v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006)).
95. Id. at 521.
96. Id. By this time courts were referring to the Anderson standard as the "Burdick test." See
id.
97.
Id.
98. Id. at 522.
99. See Ordway, supra note 1, at 1174 ("Since the presidential election of 2000, a host of new
claims has arisen alleging unlawful denial of the right to vote. Litigants have challenged the use of
error-prone voting machines, misleading registration forms, and the highly controversial photo
identification requirements for in-person voting.").
100. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008).
101.
128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
102.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 15301(b)(1) (West 2008); see also Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614 n.3,
1617-18 (discussing the requirements of HAVA).
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dence and improve election procedures. 10 3 HAVA had a provision requiring voters to present identification at the time of voting with photo
ID being one valid form of identification. 1°4 Similarly, the Carter-Baker
Report suggested that photo IDs were necessary to combat in-person
states passed legislation to comply with HAVA,
voter fraud. 10 5 Several
16
including Indiana.
A. Facts
In 2005 Indiana enacted Senate Enrolled Act No. 483 ("SEA
483"), 107 requiring voters to present a valid, government-issued photo ID

in order to cast an in-person vote at general and primary elections.' 0 8 If a
voter did not have the valid photo ID at the time of casting the vote, the
voter could later bring the identification to the county clerk's office in
order to have the vote counted.' 0 9 The photo ID requirement was not
applicable to mail-in absentee ballots. 110 SEA 483 excluded residents of
state-licensed facilities from the requirement."' Impoverished voters or
religious objectors could cast a provisional ballot that would be counted
provided they executed an affidavit with the clerk of the circuit court
within ten days after the election." 2 SEA 483 did not require a voter to
present a photo ID in registering to vote3 but did require the voter to
comply with the requirements of HAVA.U
B. ProceduralHistory
Almost immediately after its enactment, multiple parties filed two
suits seeking to enjoin enforcement 14 of SEA 483 as a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Voting Rights Act, l5 and provisions of the Indiana Constitution." l6 After consolidating the suits in the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indiana inter-

103.
REPORT

COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS:
OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM 4 (2005), available at

http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf [hereinafter CARTER-BAKER REPORT].
42 U.S.C.A. § 15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (West 2008).
104.
See CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 103, § 2.5.
105.
Schultz, supra note 13, at 485-86.
106.
S.B. 483, 114th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005).
107.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1613 (2008).
108.
Id. at 1614 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (West 2006)).
109.
Id. at 1613 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (West Supp. 2007)).
110.
111. Id.
112.
Id. at 1613-14 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c) (West 2006)).
Id. at 1614 n.3, 1617-18 (discussing the requirements of HAVA); see also 42 U.S.C.A. §
113.
15483(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (West 2008) (stating that HAVA did require a voter to include in her registration application some form of identification, e.g., bank statement, utility bill, paycheck, etc., for
verification purposes).
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614.
114.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2008).
116.

IND. CONST. art II, §§ 1, 2.
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vened to defend the statute."17 The District Court granted Indiana's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient proof that SEA 483 would prevent any citizens from voting or
would unduly burden their right to vote.1 18
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the petitioner's argument
that the heightened scrutiny of Harper should apply.11 9 In affirming the
District Court's ruling, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the burden on
the right to vote was offset by the state's interest in preventing voter
fraud.120
The Court granted certiorari after four judges on the Seventh Circuit
voted to rehear the case en banc. t 2 1 In a plurality opinion, six justices
agreed SEA 483 did not unduly burden the right to vote and affirmed the
decision of the Seventh Circuit.
C. PluralityOpinions
The issue before the Court was whether the requirement of having
to present a photo ID prior to casting an in-person vote or an early vote at
the circuit court clerk's office is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 122 The majority of the Court agreed SEA 483 was constitutional;
however, the plurality opinions both purported to use the Burdick test but
disagreed as to the interpretation of what the test was. 123
1. Justice Stevens's Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in
his plurality opinion.1 24 Justice Stevens discussed Harper to the extent
that regulations that invidiously discriminate are unconstitutional but
"'evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the
electoral process itself' are not invidious and satisfy the standard set
' 125 Justice Stevens acknowledged
forth in Harper."
there was no test in
place to measure the severity of the burden a state election regulation
places on the right to vote; 126 however, the state must still have legitimate
interests to justify the burden no matter how slight the burden is. 127

117.
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782-83 (S.D. Ind. 2006), affd sub
nom. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), affd 128 S.Ct. 1610
(2008); see also Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1614.
118.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting Ind.DemocraticParty,458 F. Supp. 2d at 783).
119.
Id. at 1615 (citing Crawford,472 F.3d at 952 (7th Cir. 2007)).
120. Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 1613-14.
123. Id. at 1616 n.8; see also id. at 1624-25.
124. Id. at 1613.
125. Id. at 1616 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
126. Id. at 1616.
127. Id.
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Justice Stevens then started his analysis by testing the legitimacy of
the asserted state interests of preventing voter fraud, modernizing election procedures, and maintaining voter confidence.1 28 Finding these interests legitimate, Justice Stevens turned to the burden on the right to
vote, but noted that because of the facial challenge of SEA 483, the petitioners had a heavy burden of proof.129 Justice Stevens found there to be
little or no burden on the right to vote, thus the state's legitimate interests
were sufficient to justify the requirements of SEA 483.130
Although claiming to follow Anderson and Burdick,131 Justice Stevens's approach does not seem to fit any of the three possible interpretations. All three interpretations call for identifying the burden first and
then analyzing the state interests. Justice Stevens's analysis began by
verifying the state's legitimate interests, and when compared to no evidence of a burden on the right to vote, the state law was constitutional.
Comparing the two interest may suggest he was using the balancing test
interpretation. However, Justice Stevens's approach did not provide a
test to measure the burden on the right to vote, which the balancing test
interpretation of Anderson and Burdick requires.
2. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia in his plurality opinion.' 32 Justice Scalia believed the other plurality opinion misinterpreted
Burdick as simply adopting the flexible Anderson standard. 133 Justice
Scalia interpreted Burdick to reshape Anderson into a more rigid, twotier analysis. 134 One tier of the analysis would allow for a deferential
standard of review when a regulation is non-severe and nondiscriminatory. 135 The second tier of the analysis would require strict scrutiny for
regulations producing severe burdens on the right to vote. 136 However,
Justice Scalia was unclear as to what constitutes a severe burden, in one
instance saying a severe burden goes "beyond the merely inconvenient,"
burden is "so burdensome as to be virtualand in another saying a severe
137
ly impossible to satisfy."'
Justice Scalia believed it was of no importance that SEA 483 would
burden some voters more than others. 138 Justice Scalia stressed that the
regulation created a burden for all voters but just impacted voters diffe128. Id. at 1617-20.
129. Id. at 1621.
130. Id. at 1624.
Id. at 1616 n.8.
131.
132.
Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
Id. (calling this tier a "deferential important regulatory interests standard") (internal quota135.
tion marks omitted).
136.
Id.
Id. at 1625 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137.
138.
Id. at 1626.
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rently.139 Therefore, a law that applied to all voters would not violate the
Equal Protection Clause and addressing these individual impacts would
"effectively turn back decades of equal-protection jurisprudence."' 140
Justice Scalia was unwilling to look at discriminatory effects; therefore,
his definition of nondiscriminatory would only include facially nondiscriminatory laws. Combining the first tier of Justice Scalia's analysis
with an indifference to discriminatory effects would allow political party
entrenchment to go unchecked, as many laws can be passed that produce
a non-severe burden on the total population and are not discriminatory on
their face.
Justice Scalia also believed a flood of litigation would occur if the
courts were to review the impact of a regulation on individual voters, a
task the Constitution relegated to the states. 14 ' Further, the uncertainty
created by the plurality opinion "will embolden litigants who surmise
that our precedents have been abandoned. ' 42 Although Justice Scalia's
interpretation of Burdick would make great strides in eliminating the
ambiguity and unpredictability of Anderson and Burdick, the plurality in
Crawford does not provide guidance as to what interpretation the Court
will apply in the future.
D. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Souter's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg joined in Justice Souter's dissent.1 43 Justice Souter
would have declared SEA 483 unconstitutional and remanded the case
for further proceedings. 1 " He agreed that the Burdick test guided the
analysis but further qualified it by stating the state "must make a particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the particular
1 45 He believed that
impediments it has imposed."
Indiana had not made
146
showing.
the requisite
Justice Souter started his analysis by identifying the "character and
magnitude" of the burdens placed on the right to vote, which were the
travel and costs associated with obtaining the required documentation or
casting a provisional ballot.t 47 In Justice Souter's opinion, the magnitude
equated to how many voters would have to shoulder the burden. Using
the district court's findings as an acceptable estimate 48 and adjusting that
139.
Id. at 1625.
140. Id. at 1626.
141.
Id. at 1626-27.
142. Id. at 1627.
143. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1643.
145. Id. at 1627.
146. Id. at 1643.
147. Id. at 1628.
148. Id. at 1632 (accepting estimate "that 43,000 voting-age residents lack the kind of identification card required by Indiana's law").
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number downward for several factors, Justice Souter determined that tens
of thousands of eligible voters would still be without a photo ID, many of
whom would be in poor financial shape. 149 Finding that a significant
number of residents would be discouraged or disabled from voting due to
subjected the state interests to
the burdens in place, 50 Justice Souter
"more than a cursory examination."'' l
Justice Souter believed the asserted state interest should be shaved
down to the precise interest and discounted to the extent the regulation is
necessary to protect that interest.152 Probing the state interests more
deeply, Justice
Souter found them insufficient to justify the burden on the
153
right to vote.
Justice Souter's approach follows the sliding-scale interpretation of
Anderson and Burdick. His analysis is very similar to that of the Anderson Court in reviewing the necessity of the regulation and taking a close
look at the state interests. Further, Justice Souter made an attempt to
define how to measure the burden on the right to vote by stating that the
quantity of voters that are burdened is determinative. However, this does
not speak to the severity of a burden because it does not define what constitutes a severe burden. Does a severe burden mean a voter must be
denied the right to vote or just have a very difficult time in casting a
vote? In addition, how many people must a regulation affect before the
burden moves into the severe category? Ultimately, Justice Souter's
dissent will do little to clear up the ambiguity of Anderson and Burdick
as he subscribed to a different interpretation than either of the plurality
opinions. Justice Souter's attempt to define what a burden is also will do
little to create a predictable measure.
2. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Justice Breyer applied the standard he articulated in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, 54 which he described as similar to the standard used by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter. 155 Under this standard,
Justice Breyer would:
[B]alance the voting-related interests that the statute affects, asking
whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of
proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others (perhaps,

149.
Id. at 1634.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.; see also id. at 1635 ("But having found the Voter ID Law burdens far from trivial, I
")(internal
have to make a rigorous assessment of the precise interests put forward by the State ....
quotation marks omitted).
152.
Id. at 1636.
153.
Id. at 1642-43.
528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
154.
Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155.
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but not necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior,
less restrictive alternative). 156
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Carter-Baker Report recommended states require photo ID but noted that the recommendation was
conditional on the IDs being free to voters and the regulations "phased in
over two federal election cycles."'1 57 Considering Justices Stevens and
Souter's analyses of the state interests in conjunction with the findings of
the Carter-Baker Report, Justice Breyer believed that SEA 483 created a
disproportionate burden on voters who did not have a government-issued
photo ID. 5 8
Justice Breyer, like Justice Souter, believed that SEA 483 imposed a
"significantly harsher, unjustified burden" 159 on the poor, elderly, and
disabled due mainly to costs involved in obtaining the documentation
required to get a photo ID. 1 60 The cost of obtaining a copy of a birth
certificate could be as much as $12, a passport up to $100, and some
people may not even know how to go about obtaining these documents. 16 Furthermore, the exception for not presenting a photo ID at the
polling place added the additional burden of making more than one trip
in order to execute a vote by provisional ballot.1 62 Justice Breyer believed this additional burden was particularly problematic in those Indi163
ana counties that lacked public transportation.
Finally, Justice Breyer believed there were less restrictive alternatives to SEA 483.164 He cited Georgia and Florida as examples of states
that had passed voter photo ID laws but had requirements less restrictive
than those of SEA 483.165 Additionally, Indiana made the regulations
effective immediately
without the phase-in period suggested by the Cart66
1
Report.
er-Baker

156.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157.
Id. at 1644; Carter-Baker Report, supra note 103, §§ 2.5, 2.5.3.
158.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1645.
159.
Id.
160.
Id. at 1644.
161.
Id. Justice Breyer noted, by way of comparison, that the $1.50 poll tax-declared unconstitutional in Harper-would be less than $10 today.
162.
Id. (citing Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616-17 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
163.
Id. (citing Justice Souter's dissent, which stated 21 of Indiana's 92 counties have no
public transportation and an additional 32 counties only regional county service).
164.
Id. at 1643 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)).
165.
Id. at 1644-45; see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.043(1)-(2), 101.048(2)(b) (West 2008); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-381, 21-2-417 (West 2007). The Florida and Georgia laws allow the voter a
greater range of acceptable forms of identification to present when voting, similar to the list supplied
by HAVA.
166. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1640 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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11I. ANALYSIS
The decision in Crawford was, for the most part, dissatisfying because the plurality opinion did not provide a clear legal standard. 167 The
Court neither resolved the ambiguity of Burdick nor did it provide a test
on how to measure a burden on the right to vote. Justice Scalia's opinion
was the closest to offering a workable solution, but his rule would make
virtually all election laws constitutional. The downside to such an outcome is political party entrenchment and discriminatory effects will be
ignored when considering election law challenges. This Comment suggests developing a rule courts can administer with clarity and predictability, while being cognizant of the ill effects and purposes behind some
election laws. Finally, one significant teaching from Crawford is that
succeeding on a facial challenge of a law will be difficult--especially
without evidence of an actual harm. Future litigants now know an asapplied challenge will be the necessary avenue in order to challenge voter photo ID laws. This section closes by speculating on the outcome of
Crawford had there been evidence of a voter who was unable to obtain a
photo ID.
A. Questions Unresolved
The Crawford decision becomes less tidy when one considers the
questions that were left unresolved. First and foremost, what is the Burdick test? There are three possible interpretations of the approach announced in Anderson and Burdick. Unfortunately, Crawfordprovided no
guidance on the correct interpretation. Second, how does a court measure the severity of a burden on the right to vote? In Crawford the Court
recognized there was no test to determine the magnitude or severity of
the burden but failed to articulate a test for future guidance. The Court's
lack of guidance on these issues could possibly leave lower courts grappling with a slew of new cases that may arise after the 2008 presidential
election; 168 however, these cases will most likely have real plaintiffs who
were not able to vote due to lack of a photo ID.
The first question lower courts will have to confront is what is the
Burdick test? Justice Stevens believed that Burdick reaffirmed the flexible approach announced in Anderson, 169 but he did not offer guidance as
to which interpretation. However, Justice Stevens started his analysis by
discussing the state interests instead of identifying the severity of the

167.
Id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The lead opinion's record-based resolution of
these cases, which neither rejects nor embraces the rule of our precedents, provides no certainty, and
will embolden litigants who surmise that our precedents have been abandoned.").
168.
See generally Posting
of Michael
C.
Doff
to
Doff
on
Law,
http://www.michaeldorf.org/2008/04/roberts-court-on-facial-challenges.html (Apr. 29, 2008, 14:43
EST).
169.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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burden on the right to vote. 170 Under any interpretation of Burdick, the
character and magnitude of the burden must be determined before proceeding to an inquiry of the state interests.1 7 t This deviation from Burdick may simply have been a matter of form over substance, as Justice
Stevens later stated that due to the absence of any evidence
in the record
1 72
the magnitude of the burden could not be measured.
Justice Scalia disagreed with the other plurality opinion in that Burdick simply adopted the balancing test from Anderson. 173 Interestingly,
though, Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion in Burdick that explicitly stated Anderson was the correct standard for evaluating burdens on
the right to vote. 74 However, in Crawford he believed that Burdick refined Anderson's sliding scale "into something resembling an administrable rule" by creating a two-tier analysis.1 75 The first tier would allow
deference to the state for important regulatory interests when the challenged law was non-severe and nondiscriminatory.176 The second tier
would subject laws imposing a severe burden on the right to vote to strict
scrutiny. 77 Burdens that are merely inconvenient and applicable to the
general public are not severe. 78 Thus, in Justice Scalia's opinion, Burdick refashioned the sliding scale of Anderson into the interpretation
where a severe burden would trigger strict scrutiny.
It seems plausible, however, the Burdick Court did not intend this
result. First, as previously stated, the Burdick Court explicitly stated
Anderson was the controlling standard. 79 Although one of the interpretations of Anderson is a strict scrutiny trigger, neither Anderson nor Burdick expressly stated it was using that interpretation. The Burdick Court
could have simply held that the burden on the right to vote was nonsevere and the state's reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction sufficiently justified the burden. Second, prior to explaining the Anderson
standard, the Burdick Court stated that "a more flexible standard applies," as opposed to subjecting all election laws to strict scrutiny.180
This statement seems contrary to an intention to create a rigid, two-tier
approach in analyzing restrictions on the right to vote. Finally, Burdick
incorporated language stating that severe burdens on the fight to vote
170.
Id.
at 1616.
171.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
172.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
173.
Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
174.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992); Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 n.8 (Stevens,
J., plurality opinion) ("The Burdick opinion was explicit in its endorsement and adherence to Anderson .... ") (citing Burkick, 504 U.S. 428 at 434).
175.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
176.

177.
law is "so
178.
179.
180.

Id.

Id. Justice Scalia, in a parenthetical, seemed to suggest a severe burden is such where a
burdensome as to be virtually impossible to satisfy." Id. at 1625.
Id. at 1625 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-29 (1974)).
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
Id. at 433-34.
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require strict scrutiny and a "State's important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify [reasonable, non-discriminatory] restrictions.' 8' The quoted phrase originated in Anderson, 82 which the Court
immediately followed by stating there was no litmus test to distinguish
between valid and invalid restrictions.183 In addition, the use of the
phrase "generally sufficient" suggests a balancing or sliding-scale aspect
to a test because "generally" does not mean "always" and leaves open the
possibility that some reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions are not
justifiable. This further supports the idea that the Court did not intend to
create a bright-line rule between valid and invalid restrictions.
After deciding which interpretation of Burdick to follow, the lower
courts will have to decide how to measure the burden on the right to
vote. Applying Justice Scalia's interpretation will, in essence, foreclose
the matter as nearly all reasonable, nondiscriminatory state election laws
will be upheld unless the burden is severe.' 84 However, if a lower court
accepts Burdick as either the balancing test or sliding-scale interpretation
of Anderson, then it will have to determine
how to measure the severity
85
of the burden on the right to vote.
In Crawford Justice Stevens acknowledged that there was no "litmus test for measuring the severity of a burden a state law imposes on"
the right to vote. 186 This fact was quite obvious as, looking at the same
evidence, Justice Stevens found a limited burden 87 and Justice Souter
found more than a trivial burden. 88 Undoubtedly, the availability of a
bypass, such as the provisional ballot in SEA 483, affects the burden on
the right to vote. 89 However, the availability of bypasses is not conclusive in measuring the burden either, as Justice Stevens believed the provisional ballot lowered the burden' 90 and Justice Souter believed it increased the burden.' 9' Furthermore, in Burdick, Justice Stevens joined in
Justice Kennedy's dissent, who did not believe Hawaii's
mechanisms for
92
ballot access lowered the burden on the right to vote.'
Justice Scalia's two-tier analysis would make measuring the burden
unnecessary. Unfortunately, this resolution would come with the side

181.
Id. at 434.
182.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
183.
Id. at 789.
184.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1624-25 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion).
185. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
186.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
187. Id. at 1623.
188.
Id. at 1635 (Souter, J., dissenting).
189.
See id. at 1621 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 1631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 435-36 (1992).
190.
Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1621 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
191.
Id. at 1631-32 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 448.
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effect that nearly all election laws would be held constitutional. 193 Only
regulations that were facially discriminatory or made it virtually impossible for anyone to vote would be unconstitutional.194
However, fashioning the Anderson standard into a more rigid legal
rule does have a benefit. There is evidence that legal doctrine, more so
than standards, constrains judicial ideology. 95 There is strong support
for the proposition that judges ruled along political party lines in the voter photo ID cases in Indiana, Michigan, Georgia, Arizona, Missouri, and
New Mexico.196 Similarly, it is more likely for Democratic judges than
for Republican judges to rule in favor of claims brought under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act. 197 On the extreme end, one need look no further than Bush v. Gore'98 to ascertain the pitfalls of partisan ideology in
judicial decision-making. 199 Commenting on the result in Bush v. Gore,
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky noted that the Supreme Court "invented new
constitutional rules and disregarded old ones to decide a presidential
election," and concluded the decision was inexplicable except for partisanship ideology. 2° Indeed, Justice Stevens's dissent in Bush v. Gore
suggests the real loser in the case was "the Nation's
confidence in the
20
judge as an impartialguardian of the rule of law." '
The negative effects would largely outweigh the positive effects of
adopting Justice Scalia's rule. Many election laws that sought to entrench political parties through disproportionately burdening the right to
vote of groups that share a political ideology would pass constitutional
muster under the guise of reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations.

193.
See
Posting
of
Dan
Tokaji
to
Election
Law
@
Moritz,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2008-04O0lequalvotearchive.html (Apr. 29, 2008 06:53
CST) [hereinafter Tokaji].
194.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
195.
Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence I (Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 231, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1260998.
196.
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation:New Pressuresfor a
Structural Theory of the Right to Vote, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 646-47, app. at 703 (2008)
("By way of summary, Democratic judges have expressed 'anti' views on the constitutionality of
photo ID requirements 14 times, and 'pro' views only 3 times. For Republican judges, the respective numbers are 3 (anti) and 15 (pro).").
197.
Cox & Miles, supranote 194, at 1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides in part:
"No person acting under color of law shall - - (A) in determining whether any individual is qualified
under State law or laws to vote in any election, apply any standard, practice, or procedure different
from the standards, practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other individuals
within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (West 2008).
198.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
199.
Erwin Chemerinsky, FurtherThoughts, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 59,60 (2001).
200.
Id. at 60. Dean Chemerinsky supported this contention by stating "[n]o prior case ever
had found that differences within a state in counting ballots violates equal protection. For decades,
the Supreme Court emphasized that state courts have the final say in interpreting state law; yet, the
Supreme Court ended the counting because it believed Florida law required that result." Id.
201.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Justice Scalia noted in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission20 2 that those in power will instinctively try to keep it, with the best
way to achieve that being the "suppression of election-time speech. 2 °3
The HarperCourt declined to discuss the current motivation behind the
poll tax; 2° 4 however, one-year prior to Harper, in Harman v. Forssenius,205 the Court did discuss the original purpose behind Virginia's poll
tax. The Harman Court looked to the legislative history of the poll tax to
determine that its purpose was to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment
and disenfranchise African-Americans. 206 In support of the idea that
election regulations can be an effective means to disenfranchise certain
groups of citizens, Carter Glass 20 7 at the 1901-02 Virginia Constitutional
Convention stated:
Discrimination! Why, that is precisely what we propose; that, exactly, is what this Convention was elected for-to discriminate to the
very extremity of permissible action under the limitations of the Federal Constitution, with a view to the elimination of every negro voter
who can be gotten rid of, legally, without
materially impairing the
20 8
numerical strength of the white electorate.
Indeed, within three months of becoming effective, the poll tax in
Harper reduced the number of African-Americans registered to -vote
from 147,000 to 22,000.20
In Clingman v. Beaver,210 Justice O'Connor echoed these concerns
by recognizing that the political party in power has an incentive to shape
election laws in order to retain power. 2 1 According to Justice O'Connor,
under the Burdick test the Court's function is a limited but important one
as a check against legislative action.21 2 A heightened level of scrutiny
202.
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
203.
Id. at 263 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment
in part).
204.
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 n.3 (1966).
205.
380 U.S. 528 (1965).
206.
See id. at 543. See also Va. Historical Soc'y, The Civil Rights Movement in VirginiaVoting Rights, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/vote.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Voting Rights].
207.
Carter Glass served in the Virginia Senate from 1899-1903, then enjoyed a long career as
a Representative and Senator from Virginia in the United States Congress, eventually serving as the
Secretary of the Treasury for the United States from 1918-20. Biographical Directory of the U.S.
Congress, GLASS, Carter, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=G000232 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2008).
208.
Harman, 380 U.S. at 543 (quoting 2 VA. CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION (1901-1902),
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF
VIRGINIA: HELD IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, JUNE 12, 1901, TO JUNE 26, 1902, at 2937, 3076-77

(J.H. Lindsay, ed., Hermitage Press 1906)). The Court noted that this was the general theme of the
poll tax discussion with the only real debate occurring as to the effectiveness of the poll tax in disenfranchising African-Americans. Id. at 543 n.23.
209.
Voting Rights, supra note 206.
210.
544 U.S. 581 (2005).
211.
Id. at 603 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
212.
Id. at 602-03.
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should be used when election regulations have "discriminatory effects 2 13
because "there is increasing cause for concern that those in power may
be using electoral rules to erect barriers to electoral competition. 2 14
Yet in Crawford,very little attention was paid to the evidence of entrenchment. Justice Stevens devoted a single paragraph discussing the
evidence of entrenchment. 21 5 Fifty-two out of fifty-two Republican
House members voted for SEA 483, while forty-five out of forty-eight
Democrats (three were excused from voting) voted against it. 21 6 In addition, thirty-three out of thirty-three Republicans in the Senate voted for
217
SEA 483 and seventeen out of seventeen Democrats voted against it.
Each of the opinions and dissents recognized that the burden SEA 483
placed on the right to vote would most likely fall on the poor.2 , 8 Justice
Stevens recognized that partisanship may have played a large part in the
enactment of SEA 483, however, only if partisanship was the sole reason
the law was passed would it be declared unconstitutional.2 9
B. A New Rulefor Reviewing Election Regulations
The Anderson standard was the result of an effort to balance the individual's fundamental right to vote and the state's constitutional right to
manage election procedures.2 2 ° Voter rights issues came to national
prominence after the problems experienced in the 2000 presidential election, 22 culminating in Bush v. Gore.2 The complexity of these issues
may not have been contemplated by the Anderson court in developing
the flexible standard. The Court's interpretation and application of the
Anderson standard after Burdick has yielded inconsistent results, with
judicial political ideology playing a role in the decisions.223 This unpre213.
Throughout Part III of this Comment the phrase "discriminatory effect" is synonymous
with disparate impact, discriminatory impact, or disproportionate impact.
214.
Clingman,544 U.S. at 603.
215.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1623-24 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion).
216.
Id. at 1624 n.21.
217.
Id.
218.
Id. at 1621 ("[A] somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited number of persons.
They include.., persons who because of economic or other personal limitations may find it difficult
either to secure a copy of their birth certificate or to assemble the other required documentation to
obtain a state-issued identification .... ); id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) ("The Indiana law
affects different voters differently, but what petitioners view as the law's several light and heavy
burdens are no more than the different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes
on all voters.") (citation omitted); id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Tens of thousands of votingage residents lack the necessary photo identification. A large proportion of them are likely to be in
bad shape economically.") (citations omitted); id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A]n Indiana
nondriver, most likely to be poor, elderly, or disabled, will find it difficult and expensive to travel to
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles."); id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]his statute imposes a disproportionate burden upon those without valid photo IDs.").
219.
Id. at 1624 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
220.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
221.
See Schultz, supra note 13, at 485-86.
222.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
223.
See supra Part IH.A.
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dictability suggests the Anderson standard needs to be refined into an
"administrable rule ' 224 or test.
The foundation of this proposed rule is that the right to vote is a
fundamental right.225 The right to vote is of the utmost importance in a
democratic society because it allows a voice that protects and preserves
all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 226 The protest that
sparked the Revolutionary War was based on the theory of no taxation
without representation.2 27 The founding of the United States was based
on the citizen's right to have a voice in the government through representation and although through the years the citizens allowed to vote have
changed,228 the right itself has not. Although this rule supports an idea
that Justice Scalia described as "turn[ing] back decades of equalprotection jurisprudence, ' 229 it is this Comment's position that the plurality opinions in
Crawford did not place enough value on the fundamental
23
0
vote.
to
right
The new framework would begin with the presumption that election
laws are constitutional.2 31 This must be the starting point in order to preserve the state's express constitutional right to manage election procedures.232 This starting point also stays true to the rule from Anderson and
Burdick that reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulations will generally be
constitutional.2 33 However, if there is evidence of political party entrenchment or the law has a discriminatory effect, then the level of analysis
would be raised to intermediate scrutiny. 234 The combination of evi224.
Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Although Burdick
liberally quoted Anderson, Burdick forged Anderson's amorphous 'flexible standard' into something
resembling an administrable rule.") (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
225.
See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)); Burdick, 504
U.S. at 433 (quoting 111.
Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979));
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
226.
See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
227.
UK Parliament, "No Taxation Without Representation"-Britain, America and the 1765
Stamp
Act,
http://www.parliament.uk/parliamentary-publications-and-archives/parliamentary-archives/archive
s.stampact.cfm (last visited on Dec. 18, 2008).
228.
See Schultz, supra note 13, at 484.
229.
Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
230.
Neither Justice Stevens's, nor Justice Scalia's opinion mentioned that voting was a fundamental right. See id. at 1613-24 (Stevens, J.), 1624-27 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
231.
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
232.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.
Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008).
233. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428,434 (1992).
234. See Recent Cases, ConstitutionalLaw-Voting Rights-Seventh Circuit Upholds Voter ID
Statute, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1984-86 (2007) [hereinafter Voting Rights]. The Voting Rights
article advocates a raised level of scrutiny, similar to the review used of campaign finance laws, that
would look more to the "process by which such laws were enacted ....
" Id. at 1985. The analysis
would also "take a peek" at the effects of such regulations. Id. This comment suggests that evidence
of entrenchment or discriminatory effect should raise the level of scrutiny to intermediate; the pres-
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dence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect would trigger strict
scrutiny.235 An intermediate level of scrutiny will shift the burden of
proof to the state to provide evidence that the law is necessary to effectuate an important state interest.23 6 Strict scrutiny will require a showing
237
that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
Political party entrenchment is repugnant to the presumption of constitutionality and goal of democracy-that state legislatures can be held
accountable by the constituency they represent.238 Election regulations
are the most logical way to achieve entrenchment.239 Justice Rehnquist
noted in his dissent in Anderson that it was the Court's duty to ensure the
state was not trying to maintain the status quo through election regulations. 240 Evidence of entrenchment should remove the presumption of
constitutionality and allow a court to take a closer look at the challenged
law to ensure "the State's asserted interests are not merely a pretext for
exclusionary or anticompetitive restrictions. 241
Evidence of discriminatory effect should also trigger intermediate
scrutiny. The strongest authority for this proposition is Washington v.
Davis,242 holding that discriminatory impact does not imply the regulation was passed with a discriminatory purpose. The Court had strong
policy reasons for its holding in that subjecting all laws having a discriminatory impact to strict scrutiny would invalidate a great deal of legislation.24 3 The Court was careful to state that discriminatory impact was not
irrelevant and it would be viewed in conjunction with the facts on the
record.244 Applying intermediate scrutiny to election laws that have a
not upset the policy considerations contemdiscriminatory impact would
245
plated by the Davis Court.

ence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect should trigger strict scrutiny. See also Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting heightened scrutiny should be used in cases where discriminatory effects are
present).
235.
See infra note 250.
236.
See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 ("In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine
the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.").
237.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 ("[W]hen those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the
regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.").
238.
See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("The Equal Protection Clause demands no less than substantially equal
state legislative representation for all citizens, of all places as well as of all races."); Voting Rights,
supra note 233, at 1986.

239.

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003).

240.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
241.
Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005).
242.
See 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
243.
Id. at 248.
244.
Id. at 241-42.
245.
The contested regulation in Davis was "Test 21," a test to determine minimum verbal and
communicative skill, which applicants for the police academy were required to take. Id. at 234. The
Supreme Court found no error in the District Court's finding that the test was "directly related to the
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In suggesting that evidence of discriminatory effect trigger intermediate scrutiny it is relevant to note the Davis Court held that discriminatory effect alone was not sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.246 In addition, the respondents in Davis did not suffer a complete deprivation of
the right to work, just in their chosen profession.24 7 There is evidence
that some voters-more likely African-Americans and HispanicAmericans-will be completely
deprived of their right to vote as a result
248
of voter photo ID laws.
Finally, evidence of both entrenchment and discriminatory effect
should warrant strict scrutiny. Justice Stewart noted, in his concurring
opinion in Davis, "that the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume., 249 The majority
noted that although discriminatory impact was not the sole touchstone to
trigger strict scrutiny, it was not irrelevant either. 20 The Court further
noted that a discriminatory purpose could "be inferred from the totality
of the relevant facts., 251 Taken together, these statements suggest the
record need not contain an overabundance of evidence to push discriminatory impact into discriminatory purpose and thus trigger strict scrutiny.
This Comment suggests that evidence of entrenchment, combined with
evidence of discriminatory impact, is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.
C. Facial Challenges
Although Crawford did not settle the proper interpretation of Burdick, what Justice Stevens made clear is that a facial challenge, where the
record contains little or no evidence of an actual harm, has little chance
of prevailing.25 2 State laws carry with them a presumption of constitutionality. 3 As a result of this presumption, a state need only offer legitimate interests as justification for the law-without necessarily provid-

requirements of the police training program." Id. at 251-52. Further, this contention "was supported
by a validation study, as well as by other evidence of record." Id. Under intermediate scrutiny, Test
21 would comply with the requirement of a necessary regulation to effectuate an important state
interest.
246.
Id. at 242.
247.
See id.
at 232-33.
248.
See Schultz, supra note 13, at 501-03.
249.
Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
250.
Id. at 242.
251.
Id.
252.
See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610, 1621-22 (2008); see also
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004) ("We add an afterword on Sabri's technique for
challenging his indictment by facial attack on the underlying statute, and begin by recalling that
facial challenges are best when infrequent.") (emphasis added); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006) ("We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the
unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or to sever its
problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.") (citation omitted).
253.
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
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ing any evidence. 54 A plaintiff, on the other hand, must present evidence that an actual harm has occurred. 255 This principle was evident in
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,256 a
case decided approximately one month prior to Crawford, where the
Court denied a facial challenge to Washington's Initiative 872 ("I872").257
The Washington State Republican Party ("Party") filed suit almost
immediately after implementation of 1-872 seeking to have the law declared facially invalid.25 8 The Party believed that the candidates' party
designations on the ballot would confuse voters. 259 It argued that voters
would assume a candidate was the nominee of the party he designated on
the ballot, or at least believe the party supported the candidate, thus violating their associational rights.2 ° Similar to Crawford, in Washington
State Grange the Court would have to speculate as to the burden caused
by the new ballot. In concluding that 1-872 was constitutional, 61 the
Court acknowledged that it was possible voters could be confused but
there was "no evidentiary record against which to assess [the Party's]
assertions that voters [would] be confused. 262
Prior to reaching its decision, the Court laid out significant obstacles
to overcome in order to prevail on a facial challenge.2 63 The Court noted
that it must resist the temptation to "speculate about hypothetical or imaginary cases.,,264 The following passage is of particular importance in
understanding Justice Stevens's opinion in Crawford:
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial
invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the
risk of premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually
barebones records. Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundaFindLaw,
to
L.
Hasen
of
Rick
Posting
254. See
http://writ.lp.findlaw.comcommentary/20080326_hasen.html#bio (Mar. 26, 2008).
255. Id.
256. 128 S.Ct. 1184 (2008).
257. Id. at 1187 ("The People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872 (1-872), provides
that candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated party preference;
that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the top two votegetters for each office, regardless of
party preference, advance to the general election.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. Id. at 1189.
Id.
at1193.
259.
260. Id.
at 1195.
261.
Id.
262. Id. at 1194. The Court further noted the record did not contain the new style of ballot
because they had not been created yet; therefore, there was no way to determine how the party
preference would appear on the ballots. Id.
263. Id. at 1190-91 ("[A] plaintiff can only succeed in a facial challenge by 'establish[ing] that
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid ....') (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); see also Crawford v. Marion
County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2008) ("Given the fact that petitioners have advanced a
broad attack on the constitutionality of SEA 483, seeking relief that would invalidate the statute in
all its applications, they bear a heavy burden of persuasion.").
Wash. State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264.
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mental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by
preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution. We must keep
in mind that a ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the
elected representatives of the people.265

In Crawford, Justice Stevens stated that the Court's reasoning in
Washington State Grange applied "with added force to the arguments
advanced by [the] petitioners in these cases. 266 Like the plaintiffs in
Washington State Grange, the plaintiffs in Crawford filed suit shortly
after SEA 483 was enacted.267 In Crawford, the District Court,26 8 the
Seventh Circuit, 269 and the Supreme Court 270 all stressed that the record
contained no evidence that any voter would be unable to vote due to the
photo ID law. The lack of evidence proved fatal in both cases.27'
Professor Richard Hasen suggested the strong stance on facial challenges in Washington State Grange set the stage for the more controversial issue of the voter photo ID law in Crawford.272 However, the Court
did state that it recognized the importance of the voter photo ID law cases. 273 It is hard to imagine that the Court granted certiorari with the idea
that it would simply deny the plaintiffs facial challenge, especially considering the District Court and Court of Appeals had already done that.274
A more plausible explanation is that the plurality opinions could not
agree on an interpretation of Burdick. Disposing of the case via the facial challenge kept the Court from pronouncing an interpretation of Bur265.
Id. at 1191 (internal brackets omitted) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
266.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622.
Id. at 1614.
267.
268.
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub
non. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd 128 S. Ct.
1610, 1623 (2008).
269.
Crawford,472 F.3d at 952.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-23.
270.
271.
Id. at 1615 ("[T]he District Court and the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the
evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute..
. ."); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2008) ("But these
cases involve a facial challenge, and we cannot strike down 1-872 on its face based on the mere
possibility of voter confusion.").
272.
Hasen, supra note 254. Professor Hasen calls this the "unfair double standard" because
the state can justify its election law by "merely positing-not proving-the existence of voter confusion or another interest. However, if voters (or groups) want to challenge a law, then they need to
come forward with actual evidence of confusion or another burden. For them to posit the risk of
confusion is not enough." Hason, supra note 254; see also Schultz, supra note 13, at 521-22.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615.
273.
274.
Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 845 (S.D. Ind. 2006), aff'd sub
nora. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff'd 128 S. Ct. 1610
(2008); Crawford,472 F.3d at 954.
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dick that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens and Kennedy could
not agree with.
It is possible the outcome in Crawford would have been drastically
different had the plaintiffs produced one person that was unable to vote
due to SEA 483 .275 The difference in the record between Crawford and
Burdick is that in Burdick there was evidence of an actual harm to Alan
Burdick, a voter who claimed he would not be able to vote for the candidate of his choice due to Hawaii's ban on write-in voting.276 As previously noted, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, authored the
dissent in Burdick.277 In Crawford, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Kennedy, stressed the significance of the absence of a single voter who
would be harmed by the photo ID law.278 Similarities exist when comparing the analysis of Justice Kennedy's dissent in Burdick with the
analysis of Justice Souter's dissent in Crawford.2 9 Both dissents found a
significant burden to exist as to a certain group of voters and that the
asserted state interests were lacking. Regardless of the facial challenge,
it would seem possible that both Justices Stevens and Kennedy would
have joined with Justice Souter in Crawford had there been at least one
voter who had been denied the right to vote as a result of the photo ID
law.
Justice Stevens's disposition of Crawford by way of the facial challenge was correct based on the reasoning in Washington State Grange,
although it may have only delayed the inevitable as future plaintiffs now
know they must bring an "as applied" challenge2 80 and be able to prove
they have suffered an actual harm. The downside, unfortunately, is
275.
Crawford was a 6-3 decision upholding SEA 483; however, provided the record had
shown evidence of an actual harm and Justices Stevens and Kennedy adhered to their reasoning in
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442-450 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), it is possible the outcome of the case would have been 6-3 or 5-4 (depending on Chief Justice Roberts's vote) holding
SEA 483 unconstitutional. The facial challenge would seemingly be a non-issue in such a case
because Justice Scalia expressed his dissatisfaction with the lead opinion resolving the case in such a
manner, Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), and the dissenting opinions did
not discuss facial challenges, id. at 1627-43 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276.
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
277.
Id. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
278.
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621.
279.
Compare Burdick, 504 U.S. at 448-450 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Crawford, 128 S.
Ct. at 1636-1643 (Souter, J., dissenting). The result of each dissent is not surprising as both used the
flexible standard of Anderson in finding a substantial burden on the right to vote and thus taking a
close look at the purported state interests.
280.
16 C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 187 (2008) ("An 'as applied' challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is evaluated considering how it operates in practice against the particular litigant
and under the facts of the instant case, not hypothetical facts in other situations."); see also Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) ("Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule may be
held constitutionally invalid as applied when it operates to deprive an individual of a protected right
although its general validity as a measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond
question. Thus, in cases involving religious freedom, free speech or assembly, this Court has often
held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally applied in particular circumstances because it interfered with an individual's exercise of those rights.").
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someone will have been denied his or her fundamental right to vote in
order for these cases to be filed.28'
CONCLUSION

The standard articulated many years ago in Anderson was an effort
at compromise between the fundamental right to vote and the state's constitutional right to manage elections. The standard was ambiguous because it was open to different interpretations resulting in unpredictable
outcomes. In Crawford, the Court had the opportunity to clarify Anderson and Burdick in order to provide guidance to the lower courts that
may face multiple lawsuits after the 2008 presidential election. Unfortunately, the Crawford Court did not provide this guidance. Justice Scalia
fashioned a rule that would remove the ambiguity and unpredictability of
Anderson, while eliminating political ideology from judicial decisions.
However, this rule would also allow greater opportunity for political
party entrenchment through the disproportionate burden of groups of
voters that share similar political ideologies.
Therefore, this Comment suggests a rule similar to that of Justice
Scalia's but allows for adjustments to be made to account for evidence of
entrenchment or discriminatory effects. The existence of such evidence
would trigger an intermediate level of scrutiny in place of the baseline
differential review. Further, the existence of evidence suggesting both
entrenchment and discriminatory effect would trigger strict scrutiny.
This rule would eliminate the ambiguity and unpredictability of Anderson and Burdick, account for entrenchment and discriminatory effect,
curtail political ideology in judicial decisions, and allow states to manage
election procedures.
The Court's disfavor of facial challenges provided guidance to litigants in terms of what type of suit to file in the future. The next voter
photo ID case that comes before the Court will be an as-applied challenge. The Court must then make hard decisions concerning the correct
interpretation of Burdick and measuring the magnitude of the burden on
the right to vote. It is this Comment's suggestion that the Court adopt a
rule that requires an intermediate level of scrutiny where there is evidence of entrenchment or discriminatory effect and strict scrutiny where
evidence of both are present.
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